Abstract: We present a theory of the state based on political leadership and reputational equilibria. A political leader first needs a reputation for reliably rewarding loyal supporters.
Introduction
In state-building emergencies after the failure of a state, theoretical questions about the foundations of the state become practical concerns for planners of international stabilization missions and for their critics. This paper considers an economic theory of the state based on leadership and patronage networks, to address theoretical questions of social philosophers from Socrates to Hurwicz (1) and practical policy questions of recent state-building missions (as described in (2)- (6)).
For example, in the administration of occupied Iraq in 2003, Paul Bremer (7) refused to allow any elections in Iraq until a constitution was written, but Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani argued that a constitution could be legitimately written only by elected leaders. In effect, they were debating a fundamental chicken-and-egg question about which should be determined first in a new constitutional republic: its founding leadership, or its constitutional rules for selecting leaders. Our leadership-patronage theory takes Sistani's side on this question; we see states founded by leaders, whose political reputations form the first constitutional laws. Bremer's 2 theory of the primacy of written constitutions would make it difficult to understand how they evolved in the first place. A complex system can be spontaneously self-organizing when it has many opportunities to start locally and then grow larger, which is true of leader-follower networks, but a constitutional system of government must be enforced nationally or not at all. In fact, the United States was founded by leaders who had already developed democratic reputations by serving in elected provincial assemblies under British colonial rule, and the subsequent adoption of the Constitution depended on its authors' personal reputations.
A theory of the state is derived here from economic analysis of moral-hazard agency problems; see also (8) . Moral hazard is fundamental to the state. Legal and constitutional rules of government are effective only when they are enforced by the actions of individuals who have positions of responsibility in the government. By definition, moral hazard is the problem of creating incentives for agents to behave in some prescribed manner when their behavior cannot be directly observed by others. So the problem of getting agents of the government to enforce the rules of the state is fundamentally a moral-hazard problem, and it must be solved by an appropriate incentive system. The state's political leaders must be the ultimate guarantors of this incentive system. Thus, the state must be established by recognized leaders who can motivate an active faction or cadre of supporters. Section 2 argues no leader can rise to power without a reputation for reliably distributing patronage benefits to loyal supporters. The extension of this reputation to guarantee the incentive system for agents of the state is considered in Section 3 as the essential role of political leadership in society. Section 4 considers how reputational expectations between political leaders and their supporters become the fundamental political laws on which the enforcement of all other constitutional laws are based. Section 5 focuses on the vital relationship between national and local leaders, which is essential for projecting state authority throughout the nation. Section 6 considers the problems of building a democratic state, in which leaders also need good reputations for providing public services that voters want. We argue that local democracy provides more opportunities for developing new democratic leadership. Section 7 concludes.
Moral hazard and leadership in competition for power
The foundations of the state must be built anew in every generation by the leaders who win power in the state. To compete for power in any society, a leader needs the active voluntary 3 support of many individuals, and these supporters must be motivated by some expectation of future rewards in the event of their success. But when rivals have been defeated, a leader may be able to enjoy the fruits of power without such broad support, and so an established leader may be tempted to ignore the claims of past supporters. Thus, a successful leader must somehow credibly commit himself to reward those who supported him in the past. This is the central moral-hazard problem of political leadership.
In a simple model of sequential contests for political power, I showed (9) that, in any negotiation-proof equilibrium, a contender for power would be unable to credibly recruit any supporters without organizing a court where his supporters could depose him if he lost their trust.
In this model, any would-be leader must recruit a band of captains to support him at the beginning of his career and then must challenge the current incumbent leader to a contest or battle. The probability of winning with n supporters against a rival with m supporters is computed in this model by the standard contest function p(n|m) = n s /(n s +m s ), for some given parameter s≥1. If successful, the leader gets a revenue flow R per unit time at least until the next legitimate challenger arrives. Challenges are assumed to arrive as a Poisson process with rate λ, and the time rate of discount is δ. The act of supporting a candidate has cost c. A supporter is willing to pay this cost only if he can expect a reward worth c/p(n|m) from the leader when they win. Before a contest for power, when it is expected that any rival will have m supporters, a leader with n supporters (each promised such a reward) would get expected payoff
A competitive environment in which every rival has m supporters is a negotiation-proof equilibrium if the expected payoff w(n|m) is maximized by choosing n to equal m. After winning in such an equilibrium, however, a leader with n supporters would get ex-post expected payoff w(n|m)/p(n|m), but then he could instead get expected payoff R/(δ+λ) if he repudiated his promises to all his supporters and took all the revenue R for himself until the next external challenger arrives. Thus, if his disappointed supporters could not cause him to be overthrown sooner then the leader could not credibly recruit n supporters unless
The main result of (9) is that this inequality cannot be satisfied by any positive n when m is a negotiation-proof equilibrium. 
Distribution of moral-hazard rents in state offices
This reference to high officials indicates that we must extend our view of the central moral-hazard problem to include not only moral hazard in political activity to win power but also moral hazard in administrative activity to exercise power. As observed above, moral hazard is fundamental to the state, as its laws can be enforced only by appropriate actions of the state's agents and officials. But powerful government agents often have opportunities to profit from abusing their power, and they must expect greater long-term rewards from serving the state appropriately. So in addition to basic compensation for the disutility of effort, responsible agents must expect greater rewards, called moral-hazard rents, as incentives for not abusing their power. Becker and Stigler (10) have shown that, in an efficient solution to dynamic moral-hazard problems, the responsible agents should be motivated by promises of large late-career rewards that will be paid if they maintain a good performance record. The prospect of large moral-hazard rents could make candidates willing to pay for appointment to such responsible offices. This analysis suggests a basic model of political competition in which the competitors for power are leaders each of whom has organized a faction or circle of supporters. That is, we should think of the basic political actor, not as a single individual alone, but as a leader embedded in a faction of active supporters. The leader can motivate his supporters' efforts to the 6 extent that they trust his promises of future rewards. Communication among faction members strengthens the leader because he can credibly commit to greater long-term rewards for each of his supporters when his failure to do as promised for any one of them would cause all of them to lose confidence in his future promises. Thus, the faction forms a court that regulates the leader's relationship with each member, and so enables them all to trust the leader more.
For this system of factional accountability of leaders to be a rational equilibrium, a leader must understand that he could not recruit an entirely new faction of supporters if he lost the confidence of his existing faction. But this is quite natural; if an established political leader tried to recruit new agents to serve as his main supporters without introducing them into an existing circle of long-term supporters, then the new recruits could rationally be dubious of the leader's promises of future rewards. Grievances can be incentive-compatibly communicated among faction members because, in equilibrium, a supporter whom the leader has treated correctly should expect positive rewards from his relationship with the leader as long as he does not complain of mistreatment. When faction members are expected to meet regularly, the unexplained absence of one member could itself be taken by the others as a sign that he lost confidence in their leader. To make this equilibrium focal, the faction members must feel enough sense of identity that their leader's cheating one of them would make the others lose confidence in the leader's promises to them all.
The members of a faction have two basic obligations in this system. They must actively support their leader in winning and wielding state power, and they must actively monitor the leaders' relationship with other faction members, so that all faction members can be confident that the leader would risk losing all supporters if he failed to appropriately reward any one of them. This organization of mutual expectations among the leader and his faction makes the leader-in-faction the basic unit for mobilizing collective effort. These are the basic building blocks from which the political foundation of a state is constructed.
From this perspective, we see that the essential function of political leadership is to serve as the ultimate guarantors of incentive systems in the state. The development of bureaucratic offices and procedures can reduce the costs of moral hazard in the state, as systems of recordkeeping in state offices make it harder to conceal abuses of power. But state bureaucracy requires more than just educated personnel who can manage sophisticated record systems; it also requires the basic support of political leadership. If political leaders do not support the standards for evaluating and rewarding the service of administrators in government bureaucracies then these standards cannot be maintained against temptations of corruption.
From leadership to constitutionalism
We have seen that, when a political leader achieves supreme power in a state, his circle of In particular, the constitutional and legal system of a state may be considered well established when any major political leader would fear shocking his supporters if he blatantly violated any constitutional or legal provision. Such a linkage may be particularly natural if the leader regularly proclaimed obedience to this constitutional system while developing his relationship with supporters, so that its violation would be a shocking change from the pattern of behavior that the supporters have come to trust. Thus, the effective power of written laws and constitutions to constrain political leaders may be based on leaders' fundamental need to maintain a fragile relationship of trust with a group of supporters.
Conversely, the effective terms of a new constitutional government can be constrained by the nature of pre-existing political relationships. The rules of a new regime are not written on a blank slate. The first high officials of the regime need support to win their offices, and so they cannot be expected to abandon their past supporters at the start of the new constitutional system.
Provisions of the new constitution would be unenforceable if they asked these leaders to violate the terms of longstanding relationships with supporters. In this sense, the factional norms that bind political leaders to their supporters may be seen as the essential foundation for the formal constitution of any state.
Political control of local government
From our political-agency perspective, we should recognize the particular importance of local officials who supervise the general operation of government at the municipal and provincial 9 levels. These mayors and governors have the primary responsibility of ensuring that the nation has no neglected areas where a weakness of state authority could provide an opening for insurgencies to take root. Mayors and governors inevitably face great moral-hazard temptations to abuse their power over the people in their jurisdiction, however. So these powerful local offices must be associated with substantial moral-hazard rents, and the reward system for these officials must be political.
In a decentralized democracy, local officials are elected by local citizens and have autonomous constitutional powers to which national leaders must defer. The next section will argue that decentralized democracy can have important advantages for state-building, but first we should consider centralized regimes where local officials are appointed and supervised by national leaders.
A centralized regime must commit itself to appropriately judging and rewarding the service of its powerful local officials. The need to assure powerful local officials that they can expect substantial moral-hazard rents for good service means that they must have status as members of the regime's politically influential inner circle. Furthermore, support from mayors and governors can be decisive in a succession contest in an authoritarian state, and so there can be a tendency for national leaders to promise more generous standards for local officials.
However, such large moral-hazard rents make local officials expensive for the regime. Thus, there is a natural incentive for narrowing the political elite and reducing the numbers and powers of politically responsible local officials, at least until the weakness of political supervision for local administration begins to create some risks of insurgency or breakdown of the state. Bates Conversely, if the goal of a state-building intervention were to establish a stable political regime at the least possible cost to occupying forces, local leaders could be given the strongest possible incentive to do the work of state-building by promising them a long-term share in the profits of power in their district as long as they can maintain basic control there in collaboration with the national leadership. For such promises of local leaders' long-term privileges to be credible, however, the regime must essentially adopt a feudal or aristocratic political system. For example, when the British were first establishing their colonial rule in India, they regularly granted long-term local privileges of power and taxation to local agents, called zamindars, who took responsibility for keeping order in their districts. The zamindars' local authority was granted as a permanent property right that could be sold or bequeathed to heirs, and so they became a class of local leaders with a vested interest in maintaining the regime. The effectiveness of this feudal power proved remarkably durable, but it also had long-term economic costs. Decades after India's independence, the regions where the British distributed such feudal privileges were still found to be suffering significantly lower agricultural productivity and higher infant mortality than other regions of India; see Banerjee and Iyer (16) . Similar scars of colonial state-building operations may be found in many poor countries. Such a feudal solution to the problem of motivating local political supporters requires a long-term imperial commitment, however, which fortunately is not available to American forces in stabilization missions today.
Instead, we should be considering state-building strategies that support the development of democratic governments. But the principle of sharing profits of power with local leaders can also be applied in democratic regimes with federal constitutionalism.
Democratic state-building
The focus of this paper has been on political leadership. A potential leader needs two reputational assets: he must be broadly acknowledged as a credible contender for positions of power in the state, and his promises of long-term rewards must be trusted by a faction of active supporters. The supply of such leaders is a vital part of a nation's social capital, and it can develop only gradually over time. From this perspective, we can see that the essential problem in building a democratic state is to develop the nation's supply of democratic leaders.
A democratic leader additionally needs a reputation among the voters for respecting the rules of democratic competition and for using public funds responsibly to serve public interests, not merely to reward his active supporters. If no politicians have such good democratic reputations, then it is hard for democracy to succeed. Voters would have no incentive to turn a corrupt incumbent out of office if the alternative candidates were expected to be just as bad or worse. The key to increasing the chances for successful democratization may be to create more opportunities for more politicians to begin cultivating good democratic reputations. Such opportunities are increased by a federal system in which power is shared with independently elected provincial and municipal governments.
In (17) The effect on encouraging more entry into national politics could be increased by having more elected subnational governments in smaller districts, thus creating more opportunities for more politicians to demonstrate their ability to serve the public. But there is one important constraint: The districts must be large enough, and the responsibilities of public administration in each district must be substantial enough, so that a politician's good performance in one locally elected office can be taken by the voters as evidence of his qualifications for service in higher levels of government. From this perspective, an ideal system of federal democracy should have several levels of subnational governments, with elected offices at different levels together forming a ladder of democratic political advancement that effective leaders can climb from local politics to provincial and national politics.
Devolving a share of power to independently elected local governments also broadens the distribution of rents in government, which can help to solve the narrowness problem that weakens the state against external threats and insurgencies. The narrowness problem arises when the national leader is mainly concerned about potential rivals in the capital or main population centers and thus prefers to use the moral-hazard rents of local government as rewards for supporters in the center. The result is to degrade public services and alienate local social leaders in remote districts until they become vulnerable to insurgency. The national president might be more motivated to share power with local leaders in remote districts if he could be relieved of opposition in the center by authoritarian repression. Alternatively, a federal constitution could require national leaders to devolve some power to local leaders. In this sense, a centralized democratic regime can be more vulnerable to insurgency than either an authoritarian regime or a federal democratic regime. In particular, the centralized democratic regime that was installed in Afghanistan in 2003 has been deeply vulnerable to rural insurgency.
Political parties are social networks that distribute power and privilege to their active 13 members. Such networks are needed to mobilize agents who have stakes in sustaining the democratic political system. Within a democratic political party, there are local agency problems which can be mitigated by local democracy. For a party to win elections, it needs local party activists who work to win the confidence of voters in communities throughout the nation.
Elections to local offices can provide a measure of which local party activists have done best at gaining the confidence of the voters. In a centralized democracy that lacks such local electoral measures, party activists may understand instead that their advancement within the party is likely to depend more on their personal relationships with party leaders than on their reputations with the voters.
Successful democracy depends on vital interactions between local and national politics.
We have seen that local democracy can help to make national democracy more competitive, as a record of using public resources responsibly in local government can qualify a local leader to become a competitive candidate for power at higher levels of government. Conversely, the threat of small unrepresentative cliques dominating local governments can be countered by the participation of national political parties in local democracy. Local political bosses should know that, if they lose popular support, they could face serious challengers supported by a rival national party. See (19) and (20) for evidence that the benefits of political decentralization can depend on strong competitive political parties.
Conclusions
Government policies must be implemented by government agents, who will eschew temptations to abuse their power only if they expect greater long-term rewards from good service. So the effectiveness of the state depends on an incentive system that can promise longterm rewards for good political service. The responsibility for maintaining such a political incentive system ultimately belongs to the political leaders of the state.
Thus, we have presented a theory of the state based on political leadership.
Acknowledged leadership brings powers of social coordination (see (21) ), but a political leader first needs a reputation for reliably rewarding loyal supporters. Such a reputation is necessary for a leader to mobilize a network of supporters who can win political power and wield it.
Constitutional laws become enforceable on the leaders of the state when a leader who violated these laws would risk losing the trust of his supporters and agents. In this sense, the reputational expectations between political leaders and their supporters become the fundamental political laws on which the enforcement of all other constitutional laws may be based.
So the successful establishment of a new democratic state requires the development of political leaders with good democratic reputations. That is, the essential key to successful democratic development is to develop the nation's supply of leaders who have good reputations for using public funds responsibly to serve the public at large, and not just to give patronage jobs to their active supporters. From this perspective, we have argued, decentralized democracy may be the best way to improve the chances for successful democracy. Elected local governments create more opportunities for politicians to begin developing good democratic reputations.
Institutions of decentralized democracy can also strengthen the state by ensuring that the state's political networks reach into communities throughout the nation.
Our leadership-based theory of state-building also suggests a different perspective on development assistance. When the goal is political development, the essential measure of success for a development project may be, not in how many schools or roads it builds, but in how the project enhances the reputations of the political leaders who spend the project's funds. The supply of leaders with good reputations for managing public funds can be increased when responsibility for spending development funds is distributed broadly among national and local leaders with transparent public accounting, as has been argued by Collier (22) .
